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Administrative Law:
The Trouble with Counting1
Jodi L. Short
Regulation counting has become a cornerstone of U.S.
deregulatory policy with the issuance of Executive Order 13,771 (“the
EO”), “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs.” To
promote deregulatory goals, the EO requires administrative agencies to
repeal two regulations for every one they propose or issue, leading
many to refer to it as the “2-for-1” Order. The Office of Management
and Budget (“OMB”) has published detailed guidance instructing
agencies how to implement the EO, which constrains their ability to
promulgate new regulations under their statutory mandates.2
The idea of regulation counting that motivates the EO emerges
from a larger intellectual project arguing that economic growth is being
hampered by the “sheer quantity of regulations.”3 In a string of
studies,4 researchers have attempted to establish this relationship
by counting regulations and correlating these counts to various
macroeconomic outcomes of interest, like U.S. employment,
productivity, and competitiveness.
1. Summarized and excerpted from Jodi L. Short, The Trouble with
Counting: Cutting Through the Rhetoric of Red Tape Cutting, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 93 (2018).
2. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
MEMO. NO. M-17-21, MEMORANDUM: IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER
13,771, TITLED “REDUCING REGULATION AND CONTROLLING REGULATORY
COSTS” (2017) (hereinafter “OMB GUIDANCE”).
3. Omar Al-Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData: A Numerical
Database on Industry-Specific Regulations for All United States Industries and
Federal Regulations, 1997-2012, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 109, 110 (2017).
4. See, e.g., Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 110; Clyde
Wayne Crews, Jr., Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the
Federal Regulatory State, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (2017); Brent
Coffey, et al., Regulators and Redskins, 153 PUB. CHOICE 191 (2012); John W.
Dawson & John J. Seater, Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic
Growth, 18 J. ECON. GROWTH 137 (2013); Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei
Shleifer, The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation, 120 Q. J.
ECON. 1445 (2005); J. B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen:
The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J.
757 (2003); Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum:
Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 808
(2001).
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This intellectual project appears to have two principal aims. The
first is political. Regulation-counting studies radically simplify
complex regulatory phenomena to make criticisms of regulation salient
to lawmakers and the general public and to bolster political support for
deregulatory policies. The second is empirical and, ultimately, legal.
By producing scholarly literature documenting a correlation between
the number of regulations and negative economic outcomes,
antiregulatory scholars and advocates generate a body of empirical
research that agencies and courts can rely on in implementing and
upholding the legality of deregulatory counting policies like 2-for-1.
Courts should not be fooled. Regulation counting is not a rational
basis for regulatory policy. The Administrative Procedure Act requires
agencies to articulate a rational connection between the facts before the
agency and the policy choices made by the agency. Administrative
decisions that lack a rational foundation are “arbitrary and capricious”
and must be struck down by reviewing courts.5 Agencies often cite
empirical studies to demonstrate the rationality of their decisions, and
reviewing courts will find agency decisions arbitrary and capricious if
they are not sufficiently justified by the empirical evidence before the
agency.6
The logic of regulation-counting studies that empirically tie
regulation counts to macroeconomic outcomes appears calculated to
resonate with widely accepted efficiency rationales for cost-benefit
analysis (“CBA”). CBA, instituted through a series of executive orders
issued by presidents dating back to Jimmy Carter,7 rests on the premise
that agencies should exercise statutory discretion to make policy
decisions that maximize aggregate welfare, meaning the benefits of
regulation net its costs.8 There currently is broad scholarly and
political consensus that “Presidents can legitimately influence the
development of regulations—at least when the goal is to ensure that the
regulations promote societal welfare to the extent permitted by law.”9

5. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. St. Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (2011).
7. See Exec. Order No. 12,044; Exec. Order No. EO 12,291; Exec. Order
No. 12,866; Exec. Order No. 13,422; Exec. Order No. 13,563.
8. Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017).
9. Caroline Cecot & Michael A. Livermore, The One-In, Two-Out
Executive Order is a Zero, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2017).
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It is not surprising, then, that supporters of the EO have suggested
that 2-for-1 is merely an extension of cost-benefit analysis and thus can
be rationalized on similar grounds.10 The difficulty with this gambit is
that 2-for-1 explicitly rejects the well-established efficiency
maximization lodestar on which CBA rests. Contrary to CBA, 2-for-1
addresses only the costs (and not the benefits) of regulations, and the
OMB Guidance Memorandum implementing the Order expressly
prohibits agencies from considering the benefits of regulation in
deciding which regulations must go and which may stay.11 This is,
quite simply, unjustifiable under fundamental principles of welfare
economics: “At least as far as economic theory is concerned, any new
regulation that offers more benefits than costs should be undertaken,
regardless of its contribution to the aggregate regulatory costs to
society.”12
If the EO and agency decisions made pursuant to it cannot be
justified by the efficiency rationale underlying CBA, they must rest on
some other principled basis. This is where regulation counting studies
come in. Such studies promise to provide empirical support for the
policy of reducing regulation counts in the service of promoting desired
(and ostensibly more efficient) macroeconomic outcomes. But as
explained below, they fail to deliver on that promise and, thus, such
studies cannot rationalize the EO or administrative decisions based on
it. Regulation-counting studies do not, and cannot, rationalize
deregulatory policies like 2-for-1 because based on prevailing standards
of social scientific research they are, themselves, irrational and
empirically unsound.
The trouble with using regulation counts to justify regulatory
actions is that they do not validly measure a construct that can be
theorized to cause economic outcomes. It is commonly claimed, for
instance, that regulation counts are a proxy for the “costs” or “burdens”
of regulation on regulated entities. While these claims have undeniable
political appeal, a tally of the number of regulations or regulatory
mandates on the books simply does not measure the costs or burdens of

10. See, e.g., Ted Geyer, et al., Evaluating the Trump Administration’s
Regulatory Reform Program (2017) (Brookings Center); Benjamin M. Miller,
et al., Inching Toward Reform: Trump’s Deregulation and Its Implementation
(2017) (Rand Corp.); Consumer’s Guide to Regulatory Impact Analysis: Ten
Tips for Being an Informed Policymaker, 8:2 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 187
(2017).
11. OMB GUIDANCE, supra note 2.
12. Geyer, et al., supra note 10, at 5.
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regulation because it does not account for at least nine important
features of regulatory law.
First, regulation counts do not account for variation in the weight
of regulations. For instance, a regulation that requires mine operators
to put their correct address and telephone number on forms submitted
to the regulator13 counts the same as a regulation requiring that
automakers comply with EPA’s complex and demanding greenhouse
gas fleet average requirements.14
Second, regulation counts do not account for variation in
regulations’ scope of coverage. A Department of Justice regulation
provides multiple mandatory criteria applicable to the vanishingly
small population of individuals who wish to claim a financial reward
for disclosing information relating to the unlawful handling of nuclear
materials.15 These regulatory mandates count the same as those found
in Occupational Health and Safety Agency regulations applicable to
millions of U.S. workplaces.
Third, regulation counts do not account for the object of regulatory
requirements. A large number of regulations apply not to private
regulated entities but to the government’s actions. These regulations
require transparency, due process, and fair administration for the
benefit and protection of regulated entities. Yet regulation counters add
them to the costs and burdens on regulated entities.
Fourth, regulation counts overlook structural relationships among
regulations. For example, many regulations contain exceptions that
limit their applicability and thus their cost or burden. Others provide
alternative means of complying with a primary regulatory command,
providing regulated entities with greater flexibility and lessening costs
and burdens. Some regulations simply clarify other regulations,
providing greater clarity and certainty in application of the law for the
benefit (and often at the request) of regulated entities.
Fifth, regulation counts ignore basic grammatical conventions
within regulations. Sometimes, the mandatory language in regulations
is explicitly negated by words like “no” or “not.” Others, it is
contained in questions—for instance, “Must I do X?”—which are
answered in the negative. Regulation counters add these to the tally of
costs and burdens nonetheless.
Sixth, regulation counts do not account for enforcement levels.
Regulations are enforced with wildly varying degrees of stringency and
13.
14.
15.

30 C.F.R. § 41.30 (2017).
40 C.F.R. § 86.1818-12 (2017).
28 C.F.R. § 13.6 (2017).
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frequency, with some enforced vigorously and regularly, others
enforced with moderate stringency or only sporadically, and many
languishing entirely unenforced. These all count the same.
Seventh, regulation counts count conditional benefits as burdens.
Many regulations set forth mandatory criteria and procedures for
obtaining valuable benefits from the federal government, including
grants, loans, leases, and entitlements. These rules need not be
followed by those who do not seek the benefits. Those who elect to
follow the rules—for instance, to obtain a mineral lease for oil and gas
exploration and development in federal waters16—do so voluntarily and
for their own often substantial benefit and cannot be properly
characterized as burdened by such rules.
Eighth, regulation counts do not account for the benefits of
regulation that accrue to regulated entities. There is empirical evidence
that in certain contexts, regulated entities benefit from their own
regulation—for instance, companies enjoy lower costs of capital in
countries with robust securities-regulation enforcement.17 Regulation
counts make no attempt to net out the benefits regulated entities enjoy
from regulation from whatever costs they may incur in implementing it.
Ninth, regulation counts do not account for the source of
regulatory requirements. Many regulations repeat verbatim language
from the statute authorizing them. Even if these might fairly be said to
create costs or burdens on regulated entities, these costs or burdens are
not agency created, thus they cannot be corrected by agencies, because
agencies are not at liberty to repeal statutory commands.
Taken together, these mistakes infect regulation counts with two
fundamental fallacies that disqualify them as meaningful measures of
the costs or burdens of regulation on regulated entities. First,
regulation counts are tremendously inflated, because they double count
(and triple count or more) many regulatory requirements, because they
count subtractions from regulatory costs and burdens as additions to
regulatory costs and burdens, and because they count outright benefits
to regulated entities as costs and burdens on them. Second, regulation
counts are unreliable because they equate things that are wildly
incommensurate with one another and aggregate them into a single
measure.
For these reasons, regulation counts do not provide a rational basis
for regulatory policymaking. Empirical studies employing them to

16. 30 C.F.R. § 550.200 et seq. (2017).
17. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 230 (2007).
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support deregulatory policies should be viewed with extreme
skepticism on judicial review. Government officials should be wary of
claims that regulation counting will help them reform their regulatory
systems. Likewise, political rhetoric deploying regulation counts
should be vigorously contested because it crowds out meaningful
dialogue about specific social and economic problems and appropriate
regulatory responses.

